Since the time of Socrates it has been an accepted premise that if we are to understand things, we first must agree upon definitions. In addition, if those definitions are to remain useful, they must continue to accurately describe the nature of what they purport to define. Unfortunately, there are commonly used terms such as Operations Other Than War (OOTW), Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Small Scale Contingencies (SSC) that fall short of definitional requirements. The operational continuum is vast and its complexities seem to increase. It is time to get our terms straight so we can get at the core of understanding. The complexities of the operational environment already evident are sufficiently difficult; we need not confuse ourselves by inadequate definitions.
Conflict seems an endemic feature of mankind, and it has almost as many forms and intensities as there are occasions of it. Indeed, there have been a number of attempts to categorize conflict by noting various discriminating characteristics (usually associated with scale, intensity or objectives). In particular, there has been a considerable effort to categorize "war" both legally and behaviorally. It is worth noting that the US has not fought a declared war since 1945. However, during that period it has engaged in armed conflict on over twenty occasions, (one lasting for more than a decade), and the so-called "Cold War" for most of it. Further, the US continues to maintain an armed presence upholding an armistice in Korea – in place for over 45 years as of this writing.
Unfortunately, the difference between the de jure and de facto aspects of conflicts has resulted in a wide spectrum of conflict often termed "operations other than war," or OOTW. Aside from the obvious logic problem of attempting to define something by stating what it is not,(1) OOTW defies easy categorization because of the wide range of operations and aspects that sundry observers, practitioners, and writers have ascribed to be within its compass.
Significantly, since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, there has been a rash of conflicts in which the US (and others) became involved. The frequency of these situations, and subsequent involvement in them, is increasing. Many of these situations began as internal problems (and were regarded as such) which, for a number of reasons, expanded beyond national boundaries to involve neighboring states, international and transnational entities and, eventually, foreign military elements. The results of the sundry involvements have been spotty for all concerned.
Indeed, the problematic nature of such situations has served to dampen proclivities for national involvement by many nations historically active in such affairs.(2) External parties resisting involvement is not the least of their considerations. Rather, the situation themselves had a tendency to be intractable and the introduction of increased military forces heightened destruction to civil infrastructure (thereby hampering post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation).(3)
The general consensus seems to be that most of the situations are more sensibly resolved through other-than-military means, yet the effectiveness of such means rests on the ability of military power to enforce and sustain a measure of stability and deter or quash the sorts of violence that would upset recovery and rehabilitative (non-military) programs. This realization is significant, as it clearly places the military in supportive and facilitative roles which are much more focused on using policing (order inducing) than combative (destructive) motivations and methods.
Not surprisingly, such recognition and limitations on the use of force (e.g., so-called "rules of engagement") seem to have led to the use of such terms as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).(4) Yet, military organizations have been used in such situations, with such purposes and with similar restraints for centuries. In the past, there was no terminological difference to such use of military elements; such use was simply one of many types of military operations. Nor has the change in times much altered this mission. A cursory review of the civil disturbances of American cities such as Detroit, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C. within the last 50 years attests to more similarities than differences in such uses.
While "MOOTW" is technically correct, the use of the term "war" carries legal implications. Such distinction renders MOOTW overly broad and imprecise. For example, applying "MOOTW" in such manner would place every engagement since WW II in the MOOTW category. Yet, Korea, Vietnam and Iraq clearly were "war." Indeed, if a nation uses its organized, regular military forces to kill another nation’s citizens and destroy its national property, most people would conclude this was "war." Assertions that it was not "declared" are insignificant to the act.(5) Thus, both legalistically and perceptually, "MOOTW" is flawed.
Some military establishments also have attempted using the term "small scale contingency" (SSC). Yet, this too is incorrect unless speaking solely of the military portion of the event – and even then it is suspect. The military’s protracted support of hundreds of thousands of civilian refugees in distant locations (there have been several recent examples) is hardly a "small scale contingency." It may be that the combat element of deployed military forces is a relatively small part, yet even in major combat contingencies, the combat support and combat service support portions considerably exceed the combat elements (the so-called "tooth-to-tail ratio").(7)
Another way of expressing why such things are not "small scale" (and why "SSC" is inappropriate) is by noting what they preclude. "Little things" become "big things" if they have major effect. Thus, if a so-called "small scale contingency" takes so much of a military organization’s support structure that it renders that organization essentially incapable of simultaneously performing its combat mission, most commanders would not consider the contingency as "small."(8)
A similar argument might be made about terms such as "Low Intensity Operations." Because the extent of combat elements committed to an operation is small, or the amount of armed conflict is limited, sporadic and/or easily controlled does not mean that the whole of the operation is "low intensity." The combat support elements may find themselves taxed, even overwhelmed, by the magnitude of the operation. Indeed, such elements may find their scope considerably larger than the "regular" mission for what they were designed, equipped, manned, and trained.
Similarly, the term "low intensity" is a misnomer as many commands have found that the majority of what they actually do is activity far more of a non-combat than combat variety. If intensity is a relative term describing the dedication of resources to a task, then those tasks that preclude other major missions and consume resources more than any other cannot accurately be considered as "low intensity," "lesser," or "limited."
In short, the common terms are flawed because the nature of the milieu invalidates them. What we need is a term that accurately describes the spectrum of situations, but is not so general as to be meaningless, too broadly inclusive, or conceptually distorting.
Since sound definitions must accurately describe a phenomena, one aspect deserving attention is the complexity of operations. In this respect, there is no portion of the continuum that is simple, but many of the situations short of war are marked by extraordinary complexity. Two key factors in this complexity are the shifting nature of the priorities and the lack of central direction and authority.
Complex emergencies often have multiple authorities, changeable and sometimes contradictory sets of priorities and goals, and, rarely, centralized direction (even for tasks within functional areas). By comparison, although combat operations are complex, the nature of war’s execution is very focused ("winning"), extraordinarily prioritized and highly centralized with respect to authority and direction.(9)
There is no indication that things will get simpler. Participants in international emergencies involve themselves primarily to serve their own ends and there is no authority to prohibit their involvement. Too, there often is the need for greater involvement by those parties that can make a significant difference, and this generates sundry arrangements involving even more actors. Yet, centralized direction often is resisted and protracted engagement avoided by almost everyone.
Nor is the opposite end of the spectrum likely to become any simpler. Although war may be, and often is, conducted unilaterally, the US seeks to engage as a member of a coalition. Indeed, in the past 10 years Washington has gone to some lengths to ensure at least some sort of international involvement that would provide a legal semblance of coalition and allied involvement in its conflicts. This is paralleled by the reluctance of other nation states to engage in situations where conflict is probable without underwriting the US acting as the general guarantor.
In short, determining whether it is a kinder world is problematical, but it certainly is not a simpler one.
A second major characteristic is that of contingency. While conflicts usually have a relatively distinct beginning and end, in much of the operational continuum origins, commencement and termination are elusive. Moreover, since objectives and priorities continually are in flux, framing plans to achieve discrete objectives is challenging. This creates a sense of managing an ever-changing process in a general direction rather than executing a discrete plan focused on specific goals. The nature of such complex operations is that of an evolving situation, wherein the process is one of managing continuously developing contingencies – all of which are complex. Indeed, it is the nature of the dialectic in these situations to preclude certain contingencies, advance others and mitigate effects while shaping the general milieu. In the words of a somewhat frazzled staff officer, "Everything depends on everything else, which always changes, and if it isn’t one damn thing it’s another."(10)
Aside from unhelpful differences in organizational culture, participants in such environments continually are challenged by the dialectic of a constantly evolving milieu. In short, what they face is a federation of intertwined contingencies that, in sum, essentially constitute a single contingency evolving through several stages.(11)
Perhaps a more apt term is complex contingency operations (CCO)(12). This term fits the situations as it specifies the complexity, describes the process, and is not overly limiting (i.e., emphasize the military aspects). It avoids the logic pitfall of attempting to define by elimination. It can be used accurately by official, governmental, military, non-governmental, and private organizations with reference to their own efforts as well as those of others. It suggests a focus on current and projected situations, and recognizes the interdependent nature of sundry efforts, effects, and conditions. While avoiding the implicit primacy of any sector, it simultaneously prevents the definitional-based tacit avoidance of involvement by organizations. Although it does not preclude situations of conflict, neither does this definition suggest such conflict that might be present as one of primary concern or is the metric defining involvement or scaling success. Most importantly, what this definitional term does is characterize the milieu and process of the continuum of involvement. This alone makes it a better term than OOTW. Footnotes: (1)This is similar to pointing at a Greyhound bus and saying, "This is not an ostrich." It may be true, but it is not very helpful. However, supporters of this type of distinction concentrate on similarities insisting that characteristics determine. This is similar to pointing at beachfront on Guam and saying, "This is not New York City." True, both are geographical places, populated, legally a part of the US, are near water, have some structures, and the inhabitants speak an interesting dialect of English. But most other measures of consequence hardly have even a remote similarity. In short, the term OOTW has grievous shortcomings.
(2)This is not to say that nations either have universally abjured or resisted involvement. America, France, Great Britain, Russia, and others continue their interest and engagement. Rather, such involvement usually has been characterized by measured means and limited objectives. (An interesting development in the decline of ideologically premised engagement has been the assertion in the Third World that neo-colonialism has been revived.)
(3)However, the chief reason remains the potential of such conflicts to expand, escalate and become something quite different in terms of scale and goals. Bismark's warning remark of "some murky business in the Balkans" as a precursor to World War I remains an example kept well in mind by many (but not all) would be meddlers in such affairs.
(4)Using the term "military operations other than war" is an attempt to define something by the participation of a component part of a larger, essentially non-military effort. For example, police are involved in the planning and execution of New York's annual St. Patrick's Day parade - and many New York policemen historically have been of Irish decent. However, the parade is not a law enforcement event.
(5)All are familiar with the use of the National Guard in riot situations, but the military use in so-called "civil situations" has a much longer history. In the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, European military forces were the means colonial powers used first to subdue and then control local populations. But they also served to suppress banditry, renegade or mercenary forces, and several long-standing institutions deemed no longer acceptable (e.g., slavery, [this, a historical irony]). Nor was such use limited to external applications. For example, the famed boulevards of Paris were created specifically to allow the French Army best use of the military technology of the time to control riots. (French Major Pierre d'la Enfant was not unmindful of this when he designed the city plan for Washington, D.C.)
(6)International law is quite clear about this. With sound legal and practical argument the Chinese ambassador in Belgrade could denounce the US and NATO as having attacked the Peoples' Republic of China for the bombing misadventure in 1999 that struck China's embassy killing several Chinese nationals.
(7)The combat operations focus of military forces often functions as a perceptual (and distorting) yardstick in considering the scale of efforts. However, military organizations whose functional focus is broader, e.g., the Corps of Engineers, are not so constrained.
(8)This is the root of much of the opposition that military commanders have to performing non-combat or "MOOTW" missions. Significantly, this has multiple dimensions as training, equipment condition, personnel density, OPTEMPO (among many areas) also are affected adversely.
(9)Indeed, considering the risks involved, not to have such a focus hazards disaster. But as war always is a chancy affair, nations who have only peripheral interest in a conflict tend to stand clear of involvement. Non-governmental entities involve themselves at great risk. Alternatively, response to an international emergency having multiple dimensions often draws involvement from both state and non-state entities. Thus conflict tends to limit participants and simplify alternatives to "either-or" choices.
(10)The same individual opined that the best analogy he could make was that operations in such environments were a combination of a circus, a zoo and a symphony orchestra wherein the ringmaster, zookeeper and conductor either were absent or took turns attempting to direct the whole in their own fashion.
(11)There are (among others) two specific differences between the dialectic of complex contingencies and those of others (e.g., war). In complex contingencies the objectives are multiple and primacy often cannot be established. Second, complex contingencies often are not managed to accomplish something but to prevent a worsening development, mitigate a situation or promote a recovery.
<12>This term commonly connotes something that may happen, rather than something occurring, essentially the difference between current operations and potential ones.